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Resumen: En 1731 un autor alemán anónimo publicó un diálogo del muerto 
continuando la tradición comenzada en la Grecia antigua por Luciano de 
Samosata. Hoy sobrevive una única copia del texto, publicada sin referencia 
del lugar de publicación o impresor y se encuentra ahora en el Evangelisches 
Predigerseminar Bibliothek en Wittenberg. Los protagonistas son el filósofo 
y físico Andreas Rüdiger (1673-1731) y René Descartes, quien representa 
en el diálogo a un tipo muy diverso de filósofo de la figura “histórica” que 
trascendió hasta nosotros en sus obras. Este artículo se propone reconstruir 
la composición de este texto raro y enigmático y contextualizar la perspectiva 
ideológica del autor en las controversias que animaban el trasfondo filosófico 
de las universidades alemanas de los comienzos del siglo XVIII.
Palabras clave: diálogo del muerto, Cartesianismo, problema mente/cuer-
po, pietismo.
Abstract: In 1731 an anonymous German author published a dialogue of 
the dead, continuing the tradition started in ancient Greece by Lucian of 
Samosata. Today a single complete copy of the text survives, published 
without indication of the place of publication or the printer and now in the 
Evangelisches Predigerseminar Bibliothek in Wittenberg. The protagonists 
are the philosopher and physician Andreas Rüdiger (1673-1731) and René 
Descartes, who in the dialogue represents a very different type of philosopher 
from the “historical” figure passed down to us in his works. This article aims to 
reconstruct the composition of this rare and enigmatic text and to contextual-
ize the author’s ideological perspective in the controversies animating the 
philosophical underground of early 18th-century German universities.
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1. An Arrival Among the Stars
In the appendix to his 1974 monograph The Dialogue of the Dead in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany, John Rutledge presented a catalogue of 18th-
century Totengespräche. These were dialogues of the dead published in 
Germany in the wake of the circulation of Fontenelle’s Nouveaux dialogues 
des morts and the enormous success of the fictional conversations composed 
by the German journalist David Faßmann, who published his Gespräche im 
Reiche der Toten in periodical form for over twenty years1. The scholar also 
mentioned an anonymous dialogue between René Descartes and the physi-
cian and philosopher Andreas Rüdiger from Saxony, dated 1731 and descri-
bed as “actually available” at the Staats-Bibliothek in Berlin2. However, I have 
ascertained that the Berlin imprint was destroyed during the Second World 
War. I have hitherto succeeded in locating a single complete copy of the dia-
logue, undated and held at the Evangelisches Predigerseminar Bibliothek in 
Wittenberg; a second copy, in the Universitätsbibliothek in Erlangen, contains 
only the first part, but importantly has the same date reported by Rutledge3. 
The text’s rarity is matched by the absence of scholarly studies: the conver-
sation is not even mentioned in the modern repertoires which list other contem-
porary dialogues of the dead on philosophical subjects4. It is virtually ignored in 
other publications on the impressive array of dialogues of the dead, hundreds 
of which appeared on a vast range of subjects throughout the 18th century in 
Germany5. This fashion, which started at the beginning of the century, together 
1) FASSMANN, David, Gespräche im Reiche der Toten, Leipzig, Deer 1718-1739. On the German 
journalist cf. KASCHMIEDER, Käthe, David Faßmanns „Gespräche im Reiche der Toten“ (1718-
1740). Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts, Breslau, 
Diss., 1934; LINDENBERG, Ludwig, Leben und Schriften David Faßmanns (1683-1744) mit be-
sonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Totengespräche, Berlin, Ebering, 1937; ECKHARDT, Nils, Arzt, 
Medizin und Tod im Spiegel der von David Faßmann (1683-1744) in den Jahren 1718 bis 1739 
herausgegebenen Zeitschrift „Gespräche in dem Reiche derer Todten“, Düsseldorf, Diss., 1987.
2) Rutledge, John, The Dialogue of the Dead in Eighteenth-Century Germany, Bern-Frankfurt am 
Mein, Lang, 1974, pp. 133 and 140. 
3) The two parts are entitled respectively: Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, zwischen 
[...] Andrea Rüdigern, und [...] Renato Cartesio, s.l., s.n., 1731; Besonderes curieuses Gespräche im 
Reiche derer Todten, zwischen [...] Andrea Rüdigern, und [...] Renato Cartesio [...]. Anderer Theil, 
s.l., s.n., s.a.
4) Cf. for example the repertoire by RISSE, Wilhelm, Bibliographia philosophica vetus, vol. VII, Dox-
oscopia, Hildesheim-zürich-New York, Olms, 1998.
5) An exception is the study by RENTSCH, Johannes, Lucianstudien, Plauen, Wieprecht, 1895, on 
which cf. infra, par. 3. On Rüdiger see SCHEPERS, Heinrich, Andreas Rüdigers Methodologie und 
ihre Voraussetzungen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Schulphilosophie im 18. Jahr-
hundert, Köln, Kölner Universitäts-Verlag, 1959; DE JONG, Karel H., Rüdiger und ein Anfang! Kant 
und ein Ende!, Leiden, Brill, 1931; CARLS, Wilhelm, Andreas Rüdigers Moralphilosophie, Halle, 
Niemeyer, 1894, reprint Hildesheim-zürich-New York, Olms, 1999; LEINSLE, Ulrich G., Reform-
versuche protestantischer Metaphysik im Zeitalter des Rationalismus, Augsburg, Maro, 1988, pp. 
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with Rüdiger’s death in the same year, inspired our dialogue’s anonymous 
author to adopt this very popular genre and compose his fictional conversa-
tion, published without any indication of its place of publication or the printer. 
The dialogue proper is preceded by an introduction in which the anony-
mous author tells us of Rüdiger’s arrival in the ‘world of the dead’, understan-
dably disoriented by this novel situation. The opportunity to verify at first hand 
the immortality of the soul, the non-existence of the primum mobile, the true 
nature of comets and the actual location of hell, to gaze down from the heights 
of the starry sky on the earth’s movement around the sun – in his eyes resem-
bling a bird roasted over a fire – temporarily distract the philosopher from the 
inhabitants of this place6. As is frequently the case in dialogues of this type, in 
this Totengespräch, too, the author must devise a justification for the encounter 
between the new arrival and an old inhabitant of the afterlife; he does so by 
imagining that the absence of better interlocutors in the vicinity drives Rüdiger, 
who would have preferred to talk to other thinkers, to engage in debate with 
Descartes:
As soon as Doctor Rüdiger had taken the place assigned to him in the 
world of the dead, he felt a strong inclination to speak particularly with the 
Englishman John Locke, whom he had admired when alive, or with Mr 
Thomasius, who had protected him in the world of the living. Yet since it is 
well known that neither the English nor the Germans are as talkative as the 
French, he was approached at once with a welcome by Mr Descartes, who 
had in any case heard much talk of him from the most recent arrivals in the 
world of the dead. He shortly began a conversation with him that, trans-
lated from the language spoken in the world of the dead, went as follows7.
Obviously there is nothing accidental in the decision to contrast Rüdiger 
206-26; MULSOW, Martin, „Idolatry and Science: Against Nature Worship from Boyle to Rüdiger, 
1680-1720“, in Journal of the History of Ideas, LVII (2006), pp. 697-711; CIAFARDONE, Raffaele, 
Von der Kritik an Wolff zum vorkritischen Kant. Wolff-Kritik bei Rüdiger und Crusius, in Christian 
Wolff 1679-1754. Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren Wirkung. Mit einer Bibliographie 
der Wolff-Literatur, ed. by W. Schneiders, Hamburg, Meiner, 1983, pp. 292-96. 
6) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 3- 4.
7) Ib., p. 10: “Da nun also Herr D. Rüdiger seinen angewiesenen Platz im Todten Reiche eingenom-
men hatte, fande er zwar eine grosse Neigung vornehmlich mit dem Engelländer Johan Locken zu 
sprechen, als welchen er in seinem Leben sehr hoch gehalten hatte, oder mit Herrn Thomasio zu 
reden als welcher sein Patron in Reiche der Lebendigen gewesen. Allein da bekandt, wie weder 
die Engelländer noch die Deutschen so gesprächig als die Frantzösen sind so fande sich auch so 
gleich Mr. Cartesius der sonsten so viel von D. Rüdigern durch die in Reich der Todten neuange-
langte Passagier gehöret hatte zu ihm ein hieß ihn wilkommen und fienge nachgehends folgenden 
Discours mit ihm an, welcher aus der im Reich der Todten gewöhnlichen Sprache übersetzet also 
lautet“.
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with Descartes. An encounter between the doctor and Christian Thomasius, 
among whose followers he is still counted, or with Locke, whose gnoseology 
had attracted fierce criticism from Rüdiger but who shared his decided anti-
innatism, would not have allowed him to stage a clash whose critical force was 
comparable to that unleashed by a conflict between Descartes and a philo-
sopher who had professed a radical anti-Cartesianism in most of his works. 
The discussion would thus be anything but a measured exchange of opinions 
between two thinkers, a fact clearly apparent already in one of the first remarks 
entrusted to Descartes: he immediately addresses Rüdiger, citing information 
obtained from other inhabitants of the afterlife:
You have constantly refuted me and made efforts to prove in numer-
ous writings how many mistakes I have made; based on what I am told 
of your works by judicious inhabitants of our world of the dead, I see 
that you have a greater ability to demolish and criticize the opinions of 
others than to think up something better and more certain yourself8.
Descartes, who died eighty-one years before his fictional encounter with 
the German philosopher, is thus imagined in the topical condition of someo-
ne who in the afterlife has not lost the ability to access information on cultural 
events in the ‘world of the living’. These comments suggest a first level of inter-
pretation of the text: the attacks which Rüdiger levelled at Descartes during his 
lifetime on crucial issues of gnoseology, physics and psychology would clearly 
be central to the debate between the two philosophers. However, we can rai-
se a further issue: to what extent did the author use this expedient to tackle 
philosophical controversies which were still ongoing when the dialogue was 
composed? In other words, how far will he go in exploiting the potential of the 
Totengespräch genre?
A comparison with the sources and with other contemporary dialogues 
and an examination of the remarks made by the two philosophers (especially 
Descartes) will allow us to glimpse something more than a mere divertisse-
ment inspired by the now widespread fashion for writing dialogues ‘in the world 
of the dead’ behind the composition of this conversation. The dialogue should 
be read against the cultural background of those years, the debates and con-
troversies of the early 18th century in which it is steeped. To access this deeper 
level of analysis we must go back to a controversy of some years previously, in 
8) Ib., p. 12: “Sie haben mich beständig wiederleget und in vielen Stücken zeigen wollen, daß ich 
mich irrig vergangen allein waß mir verständige Leute in unserm Todten Reich aus Ihren Schrifften 
erzehlet, habe ich gesehen, daß Sie mehr Geschicklichkeit besassen, die Meynungen anderer Leu-
te herunter zu machen und zu tadeln, als selber etwas besseres und festeres zu erfinden“.
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which Andreas  Rüdiger had played a prominent role.
2. Descartes as Wolffian Philosopher
In 1723 the pietist faction at the University of Halle freed itself of what it had 
for some time considered an unwelcome presence. The speech pronounced 
two years before by Christian Wolff on the morals of the Chinese had supplied 
the definitive pretext for achieving a removal which had for years been hoped 
for, but the philosopher’s expulsion was only the beginning of “the most intense 
and spectacular of all the German Enlightenment controversies”9. Indeed, a 
remarkable number of pamphlets against harmonicism, determinism, Wolffian 
Spinozism – and an equal number of rejoinders by Wolff and his followers – 
followed the philosopher’s well-publicized expulsion from Prussia for decades. 
Among Wolff’s detractors we also find Rüdiger, who in 1727, four years before 
his death and the publication of the dialogue of which he was a protagonist, 
had reprinted the fifth chapter of the Deutsche Metaphysik, “on the essence 
of the soul and of a spirit in general” (Von dem Wesen der Seele und eines 
Geistes überhaupt), adding his notes of refutation at the bottom of each page. 
Wolff’s reply, already solicited by the Rüdigerian Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann in 
a short work against Wolffian logic, would never have materialized but for two 
students from Jena who took up the defence of the exiled philosopher in 1729 
under the pseudonym “Hieronymus Aletophilus”10. Our dialogue thus appeared 
in the midst of the turmoil surrounding the scandal aroused by the ‘evil’ Wolffian 
philosophy: decades of heated exchange of polemical writings, student agita-
tions and the birth of clandestine associations linked to the dissemination of 
Wolffism, countered by the intransigent censorship of the pietist faction which 
controlled the Prussian philosophy faculties during the philosopher’s enforced 
residence at Marburg11.
9) Israel, Jonathan, Enlightenment Contested. Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 
1670-1752, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 190.
10) HOFFMANN, Adolph F., Gedancken über Christian Wolffens Logic, oder sogenannte Philoso-
phiam rationalem. Nebst einem Anhange, worinnen gedachter Herr Auctor auf die von Andreas 
Rüdigern wider seine Meinungen von dem Wesen der Seele und eines Geistes überhaupt gemach-
ten Einwürffe zu antworten eingeladen wird, Leipzig, Heinsius, 1729; ALETOPHILUS, Hieronymus, 
Erinnerungen auf die Gegen-Meinung der Meinung Herrn Hof-Rath Wolffens von dem Wesen der 
Seele und eines Geistes überhaupt [...], Frankfurt a. M.-Leipzig, s.n., 1729. The Wolffian chapter 
reprinted by Rüdiger is found in WOLFF, Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und 
der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, Halle, Renger, 1720, pp. 453-574. For a 
more detailed account of these events see the introduction by Michael Albrecht to the anti-Wolffian 
text by RÜDIGER, Andreas, Herrn Christian Wolffens Meinung von dem Wesen der Seele und eines 
Geistes überhaupt; und D. Andreas Rüdigers Gegen-Meinung, Leipzig, Heinsius, 1727, reprint ed. 
by M.A., Hildesheim-zürich-New York, Olms, 2008, pp. 5-7 and 13-16.
11) On the links between Wolffism and radical student groups cf. MULSOW, Martin, Freigeister im 
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News of these heated disputes obviously reaches the realm of the dead, 
giving Descartes an opportunity to express to the recently arrived Rüdiger all 
his impatience with the Streitschriften, the polemical writings exchanged in 
what had by now become a long-running controversy. The ideal proposed to 
counter the attacks of Wolff’s opponents is that of the “connection between 
truths”, an expression rendered precisely in German with that Verknüpfung der 
Wahrheiten which had already become a mainstay of the Wolffian method12:
CARTESIUS: those who spend their whole life publishing polemical writ-
ings certainly become famous among their contemporaries, but they do not 
achieve immortality for posterity. Those who wish to count on lasting fame af-
ter their death should write something useful and profound, which shows 
the connection between truths [...]. I am happy that we have now seen an 
end to these polemical writings on the Wolffian issue [...]. Certainly his phi-
losophy will remain a resplendent light in the heavens of Knowledge [...]. 
D. RÜDIGER: you truly hold Mr. Wolff in high regard. I had a dispute with 
him, during which I published his opinions on the soul together with my refuta-
tions. I think that mathematics has done considerable harm to his philosophy, 
since he seeks a mathematical certainty which is not always to be found [...].
CARTESIUS: but mathematics refines the intellect. It is as if anyone who under-
stands it holds in his own hands Ariadne’s thread, with which he may save himself 
from the most intricate labyrinth of fantastical opinions and reach the road of truth13.
Gottsched-Kreis. Wolffianismus, studentische Aktivitäten und Religionskritik in Leipzig 1740-1745, 
Göttingen, Wallstein, 2007.
12) On the Wolffian Verknüpfung see for example WOLFF, Christian, Vernünftige Gedanken von den 
Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit 
(1713), in ID., Gesammelte Werke, sec. I, vol. I, ed. by H.W. Arndt, Hildesheim, Olms, 1965, pp. 132-
33 and 260, n. 14; ALBRECHT, Michael, ‚Eklektik‘: eine Begriffsgeschichte mit Hinweisen auf die 
Philosophie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1994, 
p. 530; ENGFER, Hans-Jürgen, Philosophie als Analysis. Studien zur Entwicklung philosophischer 
Analysiskonzeptionen unter dem Einfluß mathematischer Methodenmodelle im 17. und frühen 18. 
Jahrhundert, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1982, p. 243.
13) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 16-17: “CARTESIUS: Welche ihre 
gantze Lebens-zeit in Streitschrifften zu bringen werden, sich zwar zu ihrer zeit bekannt, aber 
nicht bey der Nachwelt unsterblich machen. Wer auf einen beständigen Nachruhm nach dem Tode 
gedencket, schreibe etwas nützliches und gründliches darinn er die Verknüpffung der Wahrheiten 
zeiget [...]. Ich bin sehr wohl zufrieden, daß die Streitschrifften in der Wolfischen Sache nunmehro 
mehrentheils auch ihr Ende erreichet haben [...]. Gewiß seine Philosophie wird wie ein helles Licht 
am Himmel der Wahrheit stehen bleiben [...]. D. RÜDIGER: Sie halten gar viel von Herr Hoffrath 
Wolffen und habe ich auch einen Disput mit ihm gehabt, indem ich dessen Meinung von der Seele 
mit meiner Gegen Meinungen in öffentlichen Druck herausgegeben habe. Ich halte daß die Ma-
thematique seiner Weltweißheit viel geschadet, indem er überall eine mathematische Gewißheit 
suchen wollen, die doch nicht allenthalben, zu finden ist [...]. CARTESIUS: Zum wenigsten schärffet 
die Mathematique den Verstand, daß derjenige welcher sie wohl gelernet, gleichsam den Faden der 
Ariadre in der Hand hat, durch welchen er aus den verwirthesten Labrinth wunderlicher Meinungen 
sich glücklich zu rechte finden, und auf den Weg der Wahrheit gelangen kan“.
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The anonymous author’s most daring move is make Descartes profess a 
boundless admiration for the individual who, born 29 years after his death, had 
lit the fuse of the ongoing controversies. The dialogue thus predictably leads 
into the argument over the relationship between mathematics and philosophi-
cal speculation which, intertwined with the debate on Biblical exegesis, had run 
through the whole of the 18th century in Germany, becoming one of the issues 
on which part of the great anti-Wolff battle was focused.
A prominent role in this dispute was played by Christian Wolff, whose 
youthful beliefs in the need to apply mathematical rigour to theology eventually 
led to his well-known identification of philosophical and mathematical method. 
Other protagonists of this querelle include Christian Thomasius and, 32 years 
after the publication of our dialogue, the pre-critical Kant of the dissertation on 
Deutlichkeit, who expressed his opinion on the issue during a competition held 
in 1761 by the Academy of Sciences in Berlin14. The relations between philoso-
phy and mathematics also runs through Rüdiger’s reflections, in a clearly anti-
Cartesian and anti-Wolffian direction. To explain the radical difference between 
the two disciplines theorized by the philosopher we can cite his own extremely 
concise words in a passage of the Physica divina:
Ulterius mathematicorum modi sunt varii, quia possibiles tantum: in 
philosophia contra unius rei una est causa, unus modus: causam puta 
adaequatam. Item mathematicorum modi possibiles sunt omnes facile 
determinabiles, quia sunt in potentia hominis, & ad nullam aliam, quam 
humanam potentiam referuntur: modi vero philosophorum in physicis non 
item, quia referuntur ad infinitam Dei potentiam. Porro species & oppos-
ita mathematicarum sunt perfacilia, differunt erim solum quantitate, v.g. 
angulus acutus, obtusus, & rectus: at philosophorum species & oppos-
ita substantiis differunt & causis, non nisi acutiore acie cognoscendis15.
This is the background against which the dialogue’s author wrote, outlined 
by reducing Rüdiger’s complex argumentation on the non-assimilability of phi-
14) For an overview of these discussions see especially TONELLI, Giorgio, “Der Streit über die 
mathematische Methode in der Philosophie in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts und die 
Entstehung von Kants Schrift über die Deutlichkeit“, in Archiv für Philosophie, IX (1959), pp. 37-66; 
BASSO, Paola, Il secolo geometrico. La questione del metodo matematico in filosofia da Spinoza 
a Kant, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2004; ENGFER, Hans-Jürgen, Philosophie als Analysis, op. cit. On 
Wolffian method see ID., Zur Bedeutung Wolffs für die Methodendiskussion der deutchen Aufklä-
rungsphilosophie: analytische und synthetische Methode bei Wolff und beim vorkritischen Kant, in 
Christian Wolff 1679-1754, op. cit., pp. 48-65; ARNDT, Hans W., Rationalismus und Empirismus in 
der Erkenntnislehre Christian Wolffs, ib., pp. 31-47; GóMEz TUTOR, Juan I., Die Wissenschaftliche 
Methode bei Christian Wolff, Hildesheim-zürich-New York, Olms, 2004.   
15) RÜDIGER, Andreas, Physica divina, recta via, eademque inter superstitionem et atheismum 
media [...], Frankfurt, typis Matthiae Andreae, 1716, p. 18.
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losophical and mathematical method to a few short comments. Alongside the 
passages already cited we should recall at least the accusation hurled by the 
German philosopher at some mathematicians that they are “von der Atheisterey 
nicht viel entfernet”. This expression  accurately reflects Rüdiger’s stance, the 
object of a virulent attack by an anonymous group of mathematici and mecha-
nici, who in a pamphlet attacked the anti-Cartesian, anti-Aristotelian and anti-
Gassendian crusade of the Physica divina, a treatise conceived by the doctor 
as an alternative to the atheism inherent in the physics of these philosophers16. 
In the case of Descartes the author does not merely reduce the complexity 
of his thought to a few remarks – including the comparison of mathematics to 
Ariadne’s thread, an echo of that between the filum Thesei and the fifth rule 
proposed by Descartes in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. He completely 
overturns Cartesian thought on the relations between Biblical exegesis and 
mathematical method, constructing a philosophical image of Descartes which 
is not so dissimilar to the tendency to undermine the separation of the theolo-
gical and philosophical spheres typical of a certain Cartesian scholasticism17. 
The Descartes with whom we are presented is an impassioned champion of a 
mathematicizing exegesis of the Scriptures:
I do not see why we should not apply mathematical method to theolo-
gy. The latter would lose none of its excellence; rather, it would be ex-
pounded in a more orderly fashion. Mathematical method […] can be 
applied to all the sciences which possess good definitions  [...]. As to 
the fact that articles of faith cannot be proven, but must be believed, I 
am in absolute agreement with you. But this does not prevent us from 
applying mathematical method to them [...]. If I collect everything that 
Scripture says about God, I can formulate a single definition of Him start-
ing from this. I survey what the Holy Scriptures say about resurrection, 
in order to define it, and so on: once I am in possession of definitions 
I am able to apply mathematical method easily, to draw truths from the 
definitions, recombine them and finally put everything in its proper order18.
16) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., p. 18; Defension-Schrifft derer Ma-
thematicorum und Mechanicorum, wider Herrn D. Andr. Rüdigers in seiner Physica divina aus-
gestossene Injurien und Unwahrheiten, allen Gelehrten ietziger und zukünfftiger zeit zur Decision, 
Frankfurt am Main, s.n., 1717.
17) Cf. DESCARTES, René, Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1701¹), in AT, vol. X, pp. 379-80. For a 
broad overview on the debate over Biblical hermeneutics within Cartesianism, particularly lively in 
17th-century Holland, cf. SCRIBANO, Emanuela, Da Descartes a Spinoza. Percorsi della teologia 
razionale del Seicento, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1988.              
18) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 46-47:“Warum sollte man die mathe-
matische Methode nicht auf die Theologie appliciren können, indem doch diese nichts dadurch an 
ihrer Vortrefflichkeit verlieret, vielmehr in bessere Ordnung gesetzet wird. In allen Wissenschafften 
wo man gute Definitiones hat [...] lässet sich auch die mathematische Methode appliciren [...]. 
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The first section of our dialogue concludes with this heartfelt apology for 
the use of the mos geometricus in Biblical hermeneutics. The author’s pre-
text for failing to continue the conversation is the fatigue suffered by Rüdiger, 
who begs Descartes to spare him further disquisitions on the links between 
mathematics and Scripture, postponing the discussion to another occasion19. 
In fact, in the continuation of the dialogue announced immediately afterwards 
by the anonymous author, the reader would not find a resumption of the de-
bate, as the conclusion of the first part would have led him to expect. The two 
philosophers make only a few incidental incursions into scriptural matters as 
part of a broad opening discussion of Aristotelian philosophy and probability 
(Wahrscheinlichkeit). Within a series of arguments and counter-arguments not 
lacking in tension and engaging him, among other things, in a vehement defen-
ce against Rüdiger’s accusations of scepticism, Descartes would, for example, 
clarify that in the case of dogmas such as the Trinity, care was needed to avoid 
the mistake of those who attempted to demonstrate it on a purely mathematical 
basis without first believing in it20. 
We should note that the French philosopher continues in his apology of 
Christian Wolff, whose ghost hovers over both encounters, going so far as to 
defend Wolff’s conception of philosophy as “Wissenschafft möglicher Dinge in 
wieweit dieselbe möglich sind”; Descartes also presents the philosopher from 
Breslau, for his excellent work on applied mathematics, as a sort of perfect 
continuer of Cartesian demonstrative method21.
Highly striking in this second conversation between the two thinkers is the 
absence of a motif which is absolutely central to the philosophical works of 
both Rüdiger, and of Descartes and Wolff: the relationship between mind and 
body. This was an absolutely topical problem, since the Wolffian querelle mo-
nopolized discussions of psychology in Prussia during these years. The debate 
of the period saw two main opposing positions: pietist influxism, with strong 
anti-occasionalist and anti-Cartesian overtones, and Leibnizian harmonicism 
in the version espoused by Christian Wolff. The latter justified his opposition to 
Was Sie aber von den Glaubens-Artickeln in der Gottesgelahrtheit anzuführen beliebet, daß man 
dieselbe nicht beweisen kan, sondern vielmehr glauben muß, so bin ich darin vollkommen Ihrer 
Meynung, dieses aber hindert nicht, daß man deshalben die mathematische Methode auf diesel-
be appliciren solte[...]. Wenn ich nehmlich alles dasjemige was die heilige Schrifft von Gott saget 
zusammennehme, so kan ich eine Definition von Gott machen. Halte ich alles das zusammen, was 
die Heil. Schrifft von der Wiedergeburth schreibet, so habe ich die Definition von der Wiedergeburth 
und so weiter habe ich aber einmahl Definitiones so kan ich die mathematischen Methode leicht 
appliciren, aus denen Definitionen Wahrheiten ziehen dieselbe combinieren und alles in gehörige 
Ordnung bringen“.
19) Ib., p. 48.
20) Besonderes curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
21) Ib., p. 13.
90 I Philosophia 2013/1
Riccarda SUITNER
the model of occasional causes with a purely physical argumentation hinging 
on the compatibility of the theory of pre-established harmony with Leibniz’s law 
of the conservation of motive force22. The modes of interaction between soul 
and body is one of the main issues in the first part of the debate, and it is to this 
which we therefore return.
3. Pietism and Materialism
The clash between the two philosophers over the commercium between 
body and soul is outlined by the author closely following a series of Rüdigerian 
refutations of Descartes, such as that in the Physica divina (1716) or in the 
Institutiones eruditionis (1707), purged of many of their corollaries: the bipar-
tition of the spiritus into mens and anima, the purely physiological aspects of 
the relationship between mind and body (the role of the animal spirits and the 
pineal gland, the function of the heart) and the associated treatment of talis-
mans, natural magic and signaturae, demons, spectres and sleepwalkers, are 
all missing from the anonymous dialogue between Rüdiger and Descartes23. 
In their exchange we find only the essential nub of the theory, which can also 
be read in Wolff’s 1727 refutation, an original and complex approach in which 
numerous philosophical traditions and influences converge and with a solid 
grounding in Rüdiger’s physics24.
The stance adopted by the fictional Descartes immediately stands out for 
the clear defence of the dualism of substances; however his peroration ends 
only with a concise formula which, more than the argumentation of Descartes, 
resembles the scholastic developments of German Cartesianism and some of 
Wolff’s attempts to reduce the cogito to the syllogistic form25. Cartesian doc-
22) WOLFF, Christian, “Principia dynamica“, in Commentarii academiae scientiarum petropoli-
tanae, I (1728), pp. 217-38; ID., Vertheidigung der Meinung von der bewegenden Krafft, welche 
sich in den Cörpern befindet, gegen Hr. Muys Einwendungen (1739), reprint Hildesheim-New York, 
Olms, 1981, pp. 128-41. 
23) RÜDIGER, Andreas, Physica divina, op. cit., pp. 153-56 and 160-90; ID., Institutiones eruditio-
nis, seu Philosophia synthetica, tribus libris, justitia, et prudentia, methodo mathematicae aemula, 
Frankfurt am Main, Gleditsch-Weidmann, 1717³, pp. 241-45.
24) On the relationship between mind and body in Rüdiger cf. Michael Albrecht‘s introduction to 
RÜDIGER, Andreas, Gegen-Meinung, op. cit., pp. 7-13; KRIEGER, Martin, Geist, Welt und Gott 
bei Christian August Crusius. Erkenntnistheoretisch-psychologische, kosmologische und religi-
onsphilosophische Perspektiven im Kontrast zum Wolffschen System, Würzburg, Königshausen 
& Neumann, 1993, pp. 101-04 and 224-25; JAITNER, Wilhelm R., Thomasius, Rüdiger, Hoffmann 
und Crusius: Studien zur Menschenkunde und Theorie der Lebensfürung im 18. Jahrhundert, Blei-
cherode am Harz, Nieft, 1939, pp. 15-20.
25) Cf. for example the Deutsche Metaphysik: „Wenn wir deutlich erkennen wollen, wie wir durch 
diese Gründe überführet werden, daß wir sind; so werden wir befinden, daß in diesen Gedancken 
folgender Schluß stecket: Wer sich seiner und anderer Dinge bewust ist, der ist. Wir sind uns unse-
rer und anderer Dinge bewust. Also sind wir“ (WOLFF, Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, 
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trine is reduced to a bare-bones reasoning culminating in the definition of the 
soul as a “thinking essence”:
However, I must distinguish between soul and body, which do not 
make up a single whole. The body and its essence consist in its ex-
tension in length, width, and depth. If the soul were extensive, it 
would itself be a body, but being corporeal it would be unable to 
achieve immortality [...]. The body is unable to think; the soul is not 
a body; the soul is in man; from this it follows that thought proceeds 
from the soul, and therefore that the soul is a thinking essence26.
Rüdiger has no doubts as to the greater efficacy of his solution, and coun-
ters by denying that the essence of the soul lies in thought, provoking some 
malevolent insinuations from Descartes:
R.: it is proven that the soul thinks and that no body can think purely by virtue 
of its mechanical functioning. However, it does not follow from this that the 
essence of the soul resides in thought. The latter, as I have already <said> 
before, is a property of the soul, not its essence. In my philosophy, I postu-
late a difference between matter and body, and since something that is not 
material cannot exist, I do not think it is wrong to ascribe matter to the soul.
C.: just a little while ago you accused mathematicians of wishing to make ev-
erything in theology and psychology measurable, as one does with circles 
and triangles, and now you begin to claim that the soul is material, but you too 
could demonstrate this geometrically, since what is material is measurable27.
der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, op. cit., p. 4). On the German reception of the cogito in the 
18th century cf. RÖD, Wolfgang, Le Cogito ergo sum dans la philosophie universitaire allemande au 
XVIIIe siècle, in La passion de la raison. Hommage a Ferdinand Alquié, ed. by J.-L. Marion, Paris, 
PUF, 1983, pp. 305-22. On the relationship between Wolff and 17th-century syllogistics see the in-
troduction by Hans W. Arndt to WOLFF, Christian, Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des men-
schlichen Verstandes, op. cit., pp. 31-55; on the anti-Cartesian polemic underlying the syllogistics 
of the Metafisica tedesca cf. CORR, Charles, Cartesian Themes in Wolff’s German Metaphysics, in 
Christian Wolff 1679-1754, op. cit., p. 115.
26) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 18-19:“Indessen aber muß ich doch 
die Seele von dem Cörper unterscheiden, denn die Seele und Cörper ist nicht einerley Ding. Der 
Cörper nun und sein Wesen, bestehet in der Ausdehnung in die Länge Breite und Dicke. Wäre die 
Seele ausgedehnet, so wäre sie auch ein Cörper, ist sie ein Cörper so kan sie nicht unsterblich seyn 
[...]. Kein Cörper kan gedencken, die Seele ist kein Cörper die Seele ist im Menschen also kommt 
das Gedencken der Seele zu folglich ist die Seele ein gedenckendes Wesen“.
27) Ib., p. 19: “R.: Daß die Seele gedencket, und daß kein Cörper vermöge seines mechanismi 
gedencken kan, bleibet wohl eine ausgemachte Sache, allein daraus erfolget noch nicht daß das 
Wesen der Seelen in Gedancken bestehe. Das Gedancken ist wie ich vorher schon einmahl eine 
Eigenschafft der Seelen, aber nicht das Wesen derselben. Ich mache nach meiner Weltweißheit 
einen Unterschied unter der Materie und dem Cörper, und weil doch eine Sache die keine Materie 
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From the outset, Rüdiger’s words anticipate some fundamental features of 
his approach to the problem of the modes of communication between mind 
and body: the distinction between materiality and corporeality and the affirma-
tion of soul’s material nature. According to the philosopher, extension is proper 
not to matter alone, but to all created things. The true prerogative of bodies is 
elasticity, resulting from the movement of ether (composed of particulae ra-
diantes) and air (caused by the movement of bullulae). All elements are com-
posed of materia prima, a substance created by God ex nihilo. Rüdiger thus 
postulated an equivalence between matter, extension and created nature, and 
ascribed all these properties to the soul28. This identification gave the philo-
sopher a double theoretical advantage which in his eyes made his position a 
decisive argument in support of orthodoxy. On the one hand his stance allowed 
for physical influx, strengthening the positions already adopted by Wolff’s pie-
tist adversaries who abhorred the underlying ‘fatalism’ of Leibnizian-Wolffian 
pre-established harmony; on the other, it avoided unduly mingling God and his 
creatures29. Corporeality thus became the true distinction between soul and 
body, with the soul (or more accurately, as we will see below, the soul conside-
red as subjectum) being characterized as a material and incorporeal extension. 
This formulation of the classic problem concerning the modes of interaction 
between mind and body was undoubtedly a bold one, and not just because 
it was materialistic with clear mortalistic implications. The theory whose main 
points we have summarized above was truly unique in the philosophy of the 
time because it was espoused by a figure strongly influenced by the spiritual 
sphere of pietism: a philosopher who associated the assertion that the human 
soul possessed a material component and its mortality with a defence of the 
model of physical influx, explicit apologetic intents and a categorical condem-
nation of the positions of Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff. It is thus unsurprising 
that at the time Rüdiger’s solution drew disdain from many, including Wolff’s two 
student supporters, incapable of seeing that a characteristic such as elasticity 
might actually support influxus, and the Wolffian Georg Volckmar Hartmann. 
The latter was a doctor at Erfurt, who as a student had heard Wolff lecture at 
Halle and, with Carl Günther Ludovici, was among the first historiographers of 
Wolffism; in the pages of his Anleitung zur Historie der leibnitzisch-wolffischen 
hat gar nicht subsistiren kan, so glaube ich daß man nicht unrecht thue, wenn man der Seele eine 
Materie beylege. C.: Kurz vorhero gaben Sie den Mathematicis Schuld, daß sie alles in der Lehre 
von Gott und der Seele mit einem Circkel und Dreyeck ausmessen wollten, und itzo fangen Sie 
selbst an, von der Seele zu urtheilen, daß sie materiell wäre, finde dieses statt so könten sie auch 
die Seele mit Circkel und dreyeck ausmessen, indem doch alle Materie gemessen werden kann“.
28) Cf. Rüdiger’s preface to a Gegen-Meinung, pp. 8 and 16-18 (unnumbered).
29) Cf. respectively Rüdiger’s preface to a Gegen-Meinung, op. cit., p. 9 (unnumbered); Id., Physica 
divina, op. cit., p. 87.
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Philosophie (1737) he showed himself to be rather disconcerted to find the 
term ‘matter’ explained through the concept of creation30.
It is the Rüdiger of the Gegen-Meinung who points out that designating ex-
tension as an essence of the body, alongside the belief in the material nature of 
the soul, might seem dangerous to many since it implied its mortality. However, 
he believed he could forestall any accusations of mortalism by hypothesizing 
that the soul was not immortal by nature, but that it could become so thanks to 
the intervention of divine grace31. The assistance of grace is not mentioned in 
our dialogue of the dead. Rüdiger does, however, concisely expound his belief 
that the soul was composed “aus einer unsterblichen Materie”; Descartes’ re-
ply is unsurprising: “That is easy to say, but not immediately provable. How can 
matter be immortal? The burden of proof now lies on you”. Faced with this sort 
of answer, forcing him to respond to legitimate objections with more explicit 
proof, Rüdiger must clarify matters to his adversary:
My answer would require a long series of deductions: I would first 
have to explain what I really mean by the term ‘matter’, since it seems 
to me that before you did not truly understand my ideas on this, but in 
this way we will never come to an agreement in this discussion. I see 
that someone over there has started listening in and laughing at our 
philosophical conversation: perhaps our talk is too refined for him32.
If contemporary intellectuals did indeed have difficulties in understanding 
Rüdiger’s notion of matter, this can also be explained by another feature, the 
theory of a soul consisting partly of a material substratum (subjectum), exten-
sive and incorporeal, but in abstracto, as a part of the body, inextensive and 
immaterial, something divine and simultaneously a created force (eine ges-
chaffene Kraft)33. The author of the dialogue of the dead, who does not mention 
the latter doctrine, was well aware of the many difficulties besetting Rüdiger’s 
psychology. We see this from his self-satisfaction at demonstrating that he 
cannot counter Descartes’ objections: the German philosopher breaks off the 
30) ALETOPHILUS, Hieronymus, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 39; HARTMANN, Georg V., Anleitung 
zur Historie der leibnitzisch-wolffischen Philosophie [...], Frankfurt am Mein-Leipzig, Cuno, 1737, 
reprint ed. by J. École, Hildesheim-New York, Olms, 1973, pp. 932-33, n. k.
31) Cf. Rüdiger’s preface to Gegen-Meinung, op. cit., p. 8 (unnumbered).
32) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 19-20: “Meine Antwort forderte eine 
weite Deduction, dasjenige zu erklären, was ich eigentlich durch die Materie verstehe, denn ehe 
und bevor Sie meinen Concepten der von der Materie nicht völlig inne haben, werden wir auch in 
dieser Sache nicht einig werden können. Allein, ich sehe daß uns dort jemand zu höret und über 
unsern Philosophischen Discours zu lachen anfänget, indem er vielleicht vor seine Nase gar zu 
subtil seyn muß“.
33) Cf. Rüdiger’s preface to Gegen-Meinung, op. cit., pp. 21-22 (unnumbered).
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discussion of immortal matter by distracting his interlocutor with the pretext of 
the inopportune interference of other dead people, listening in and laughing at 
their discussion. Something very similar happens when Descartes is entrusted 
with an argument that must have seemed irrefutable to a philosopher of the 
Totenreich, the continuing ability to think of the inhabitants of the realm of the 
dead, now without their body:
However, the soul is a spiritual and thinking essence. From your prin-
ciples it should follow that it cannot think except through the body, 
but this is madness since the soul is an independent essence or sub-
stance [...]. From your premises we would be forced to conclude 
that if it were separated from the body it would be unable to think, but 
you see clearly that we can still do so here in the world of the dead34.
Descartes’s insidious objection forces Rüdiger to extract himself from the 
ongoing discussion as best he can, premising his reply with the statement that 
“I don’t willingly discuss the condition of the soul after death, because I am not 
a theologian”. Our anonymous author uses the same procedure when, ascri-
bing to Descartes’s adversary a very un-Rüdigerian terminology, he makes him 
postulate a distinction between a soul conjoined with the body (dem Cörper 
vereinigte), and one in and for itself (an und vor sich selbst), able to think even 
without its body:
C.: [...] the soul must have in itself the power to think since otherwise it 
could not exist without the body [...]. 
R.: we will never finish our dispute if we continue to argue in this way. You 
are speaking of souls in and for themselves and of the fact that they can 
think even without the body. But this is something I have never thought to 
deny. Even the angels must necessarily be able to think, although they are 
incorporeal, and so souls in and for themselves must also be able to do so 
[...]. We must therefore distinguish between the soul in and for itself and 
the soul which is joined with the body, to avoid concluding our dispute in 
an erroneous way. The soul in and for itself can certainly think without the 
opportunity afforded by the senses, but this is not an ability possessed by 
the soul which is joined to the body35.
34) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., p. 38: “Die Seele aber ist ein Geist und 
ein gedenckendes Wesen nach Ihren Principiis aber müste folgen daß die Seele nichts gedencken 
könne als durch den Leib welches doch wieder alle Vernunfft ist, indem die Seele doch ein Wesen 
an und vor sich selbst oder eine Substanz ist [...]. Dahingegen man nach Ihrem Grund-Sätzen den 
Schluß fassen müste, daß die Seele wenn sie vom Leibe abgesondert wäre, nichts gedencken 
könte, wir können ja auch noch im Todten Reiche gedencken“.
35) Ib., 38-39: “C.: [...] die Seele muß doch eine Krafft in sich selber haben zu gedencken, weil 
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This is followed by Descartes’ predictable and vigorous defence of the exis-
tence of innate ideas. Discomfited, Rüdiger is forced to bring into play both a 
vehement denial of the innatism which he had professed, especially in an anti-
Cartesian dissertation of  170436, and the difficulty for a reader ‘in the world of 
the living’ of comprehending such subtle discussions:
C.: however, if the soul in and for itself can think without the opportunity 
afforded by the senses, it must possess within itself the ideas of which it 
thinks, in other words innate ideas must exist [...].
R.: our dispute is becoming excessively difficult: I am unable to express 
myself well on this issue, in such a way that a mortal reading our dialogue 
of the dead could fully understand. So I only wish to answer as follows: 
the soul in and for itself can think without the body but from this it does not 
necessarily follow that the ideas on which it reflects are innate and within 
the soul. As long as it is joined to the body, it draws ideas from the outside, 
through the senses. However, no-one can be sure that a soul without a 
body cannot also grasp something from the outside, by a means other 
than the senses, and that it therefore needs to have innate ideas within 
itself37.
With these remarks the space devoted by the anonymous author to one of 
the most hotly debated issues of the Frühaufklärung ends. The contrast bet-
ween a pro-pietist view of the relationship between mind and body and a more 
sharply dualistic one, however different from that of Descartes, had been the 
sie sonst ohne dem Leib nicht bestehen [...] könte [...]. R.: Wir werden unsern Streit nicht leicht 
endigen, wenn wir auf diese Arth zu disputiren fortfahren. Sie reden von der Seelen an und vor 
sich selbst und daß sie auch ohne den Leib gedencken könne. Dieses aber hab ich mir niemahlen 
vorgenommen zu leugnen. Es müssen doch nothwendig die Engel auch gedencken können, ob sie 
gleich keinen Leib haben, und also auch die Seelen an und vor sich selbst [...]. Wir müssen also 
die Seele an und vor sich selbst von der mit dem Cörper vereinigten Seele unterscheiden, um in 
diesem Dispute keinen Fehl-Schluß zu begehen. Die Seele an und vor sich selbst mag ohne Gele-
genheit der Sinnen allerdings gedencken aber nicht die mit dem Cörper vereinigte Seele“.
36) RÜDIGER, Andreas, Disputatio philosophica de eo, quod omnes ideae oriantur a sensione, 
Leipzig, Brandenburger, 1704.
37) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 39-40: “C.: Allein wenn die Seele an 
und vor sich selbst ohne die Gelegenheit von denen Sinnen vor sich zu haben gedencken kan so 
muß sie ja die Ideen von welchen sie gedencket in sich haben folgends müssen es ideae innatae 
seyn von denen sie gedencket [...]. R.: Unser Disput gehet zu hoch und kan ich mich nicht wohl 
von dieser Materie also erklären, daß ein Sterblicher der diese unsre Toden-Gespräche lieset, es 
vollkommen verstehen sollte. Indessen will ich Ihnen nur dieses antworten. Die Seele kan ohne den 
Leib an und vor sich selbst gedencken, allein daraus folget noch nicht das die Ideen welche sie als 
denn überleget ihr eingebohren und in ihr seyn. So lange sie mit dem Cörper verknüpffet ist, fasset 
sie dieselbe von aussen durch die Sinnen. Wer aber hat Sie versichert, daß eine Seele ohne Cörper 
nicht auch etwas von aussen erkennen sollte, und zwar auf eine andere Arth als durch die Sinnen 
also brauchte sie dieselbe nicht eingebohren zu haben“.
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subject of a dialogue of the dead published a year beforehand and even more 
explicitly engaged in the Wolffian issue.
4. Leibniz and Budde, Descartes and Rüdiger: Two 
Totengespräche Compared
The list forming part of the entry Wolfische Philosophie in Johann Heinrich 
Zedler’s Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon, written by the Wolffian Carl 
Günther Ludovici, counts more than four hundred Streitschriften exchanged 
during the dispute over Wolffism. At number 201 we find a dialogue of the dead 
whose protagonists are Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Johann Franz Budde, 
described as anonymous and sometimes attributed by modern scholars to 
David Faßmann38. The only scholar besides Rutledge to deal with German dia-
logues of the dead who mentions the dialogue between Descartes and Rüdiger, 
Johannes Rentsch, classified these two texts in two different categories: the 
conversation between Leibniz and Budde among the Gelehrtennekrologe and 
that between Descartes and Rüdiger among the Streitschriften. The latter term 
is used without reference to the Wolffian dispute, to the extent that this cate-
gory also comprises a dialogue between Friedrich Spanheim and the legen-
dary medieval Pope Joan39. However, there are an extraordinary large number 
of points of contact between the two dialogues, which are so similar that the 
two texts may even have been written by the same author.
The dialogue between Budde and Leibniz, again divided into two parts, 
covers an impressive variety of themes and motifs (of which apocatastasis, 
Chinese philosophy, the kabbala, traducianism and theodicy are only a few). 
However, it shares various major concerns with the conversation between 
Descartes and Rüdiger, and the author’s prose presents some extraordinary 
affinities. Just as Rüdiger had chosen to refute Wolff by reprinting part of the 
German Metaphysics, adding his own criticisms in the footnotes, so Budde had 
composed a refutation of the same Wolffian work, this time reprinted by Wolff 
with his rejoinders at the bottom of the page40. Both dialogues thus present 
38) Ausserordentliches Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, zwischen [...] Leibnitzen, und [...] Bud-
deo, s.l., s.n. 1730. LUDOVICI, Carl G., «Wolfische Philosophie», in zEDLER, Johann H., Grosses 
vollständiges Universal-Lexicon [...], Leipzig-Halle, s.n. 1748, p. 1079. The dialogue is attributed 
to Faßmann by e.g. RISSE, Wilhelm, Bibliographia philosophica vetus, op. cit., p. 141; Leibniz-
Bibliographie. Verzeichnis der Literatur über Leibniz bis 1980, ed. by A. Heinekamp, Frankfurt a. 
M., Klostermann, 1984, pp. 334-35. On this text cf. SUITNER, Riccarda, Ateismo e pietismo in 
un dialogo anonimo della “Frühaufklärung”, in Dal cartesianismo all’illuminismo radicale, ed. by C. 
Borghero and C. Buccolini, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2010, pp. 263-79.
39) RENTSCH, Johannes, Lucianstudien, op. cit., p. 43, nn. 46 and 48.
40) BUDDE, J. Franz, Bedencken über die Wolffianische Philosophie, mit Anmerckungen erläutert 
von Christian Wolffen [...], Frankfurt am Main, Andreä, 1724, reprint ed. by J. École, Hildesheim-
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a contrast between a philosopher who had played a leading role in the anti-
Wolffian crusade, close to pietism and recently deceased, like Rüdiger and 
Budde, who died in 1729, a year before the publication of the dialogue of which 
he is protagonist, and a philosopher of a previous generation, given the task 
of continuing the cause of the praeceptor Germaniae (Descartes and Leibniz).
Other themes common to both works are atheism, the obsession of the pie-
tist theologians of the early 18th century and the polemical target of countless 
dissertations and treatises by the pro-pietist Budde and Rüdiger; the status of 
mathematics and its relations with philosophical speculation; the vexata quaes-
tio of the communication between mind and body, the subject of the fictitious 
clash between the influxist Budde and Leibniz and between Descartes and 
Rüdiger, author of the controversial and highly personal version of the influxus 
physicus discussed above. These discussions are often introduced in the con-
text of the characters’ debate over the Wolffian issue; in the Gespräch between 
Budde and Leibniz the author makes the dialogue’s main motif clear from the 
introduction, presenting us with a Budde who has just arrived in the afterlife 
and is determined to combat the monotony of life after death by starting a con-
versation with Leibniz. The latter, for his part, has not given up on entertaining 
an epistolary correspondence as he did in life, and his correspondents have in 
the meantime informed him in detail on the ongoing controversies between the 
pietist and Wolffian factions41.
The constant communication between the world of the living and the after-
life postulated in both dialogues is a perfect pretext for circumventing the diffi-
culties of making the level of literary fiction compatible with that of history and 
biography. For obvious chronological reasons the author (or authors), especia-
lly for Descartes and to a lesser extent for Leibniz, could not avail themselves 
of pronunciations by the two philosophers on these recent disputes, connected 
to recent decades of cultural life in Prussian university towns. As a consequen-
ce, the interlocutors called upon to defend Christian Wolff inevitably pay the 
highest price for the literary transposition of these complex issues. Moulded by 
the pen of the anonymous author in such a way as to become plausible interlo-
cutors for thinkers from whom they were separated by at least a generation, it is 
their ideas which are more or less deliberately simplified and distorted.
Although the remarks assigned to their protagonists are coated in a layer of 
ingenuity, however, the author of the two dialogues demonstrates an extraor-
dinary erudition and philosophical awareness. The reader is required to have 
New York, Olms, 1980. 
41) Ausserordentliches Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, zwischen [...] Leibnitzen, und [...] 
Buddeo, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
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a degree of familiarity with the academic controversies of the period and pos-
sess a broad range of erudite notions; without these, a fair understanding of the 
dialogue would be virtually impossible. The initial comparison in the dialogue 
between Rüdiger and Descartes with which we started, that between the mo-
vement of the earth around the sun and the roasting of a bird, is anything but 
a naive metaphor: in fact, it is a commonplace of Copernican literature, to be 
found also in Eusèbe Renaudot, Claude de Chaulnes, Pierre Gassendi and 
Cyrano de Bergerac42.  
One of the first discussions between Descartes and Rüdiger turns on the 
expression “malim convivis quam placuisse cocis”, a motto which appears in 
the background of the title page engraving of the 1717 edition of Rüdiger’s 
Institutiones eruditionis43. This is a fairly refined quotation, with which Rüdiger 
intended to allude polemically in his major work to the numerous detractors 
of his writings: it is the final line of Martial’s Epigram IX, 81 “Lector et auditor 
nostros probat, Aule, libellos/sed quidam exactos esse poeta negat/Non ni-
mium curo: nam cenae fercula nostrae/malim convivis quam placuisse cocis” 
(“O Aulus, those who hear my little books praise them; but a certain poet says 
that they are not perfect. I don’t attach too much weight to him; for I would prefer 
the dishes on my table to please guests rather than cooks”). 
From what we have seen above it is also clear that the tone of the debate 
between Descartes and Rüdiger (and of that between Leibniz and Budde) re-
veals the author’s in-depth knowledge of the controversies raging in the circles 
gravitating around the Prussian philosophy faculties, with whom he must have 
been in very close contact. The highly erudite nature of the Rüdiger-Descartes 
dialogue makes it fairly similar to an academic dissertation, decidedly oversha-
dowing its original literary connotations as an expression of the Totengespräch 
genre. In the conclusion to the second part, the work’s dialogue structure even 
gives way to a pastiche constructed by juxtaposing long quotations from con-
temporary scientific dissertations44.     
“Halam tendis? Aut pietista aut atheista reversurus!” (“Are you going to 
Halle? You will come back a pietist or an atheist!”): this saying, very popular 
among the students of the early 18th century, shows how strongly the existence 
of two genuine competing factions was felt at the time. They were nonethe-
less intertwined, as demonstrated by the representative case of Christian 
Thomasius, protagonist among other things of a series of dialogues of the 
42) Cf. CYRANO DE BERGERAC, Savinien de, L’autre monde ou Les éstats et empires de la lune 
(1650), ed. by  M. Alcover, Paris, Champion, 1977, p. 16.
43) Curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., p. 11.
44) Besonderes curieuses Gespräche im Reiche derer Todten, op. cit., pp. 38-56.
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dead with August Hermann Francke45. The dialogue form of the two texts com-
pared here is particularly well suited to ‘staging’, perhaps in a somewhat re-
ductive but extremely effective manner, the clash between a ‘rationalist’ faction 
personified by Descartes or Leibniz, and the anti-Cartesian, anti-Wolffian and 
anti-Spinozan faction close to the pietism represented by Rüdiger and Budde.
The role of defender of Christian Wolff entrusted to Descartes does not 
conflict with the French philosopher’s reception in early 18th-century Germany, 
generally in the shadow of Wolffian philosophy, in the light of which Descartes 
was misunderstood and exploited. In the environment gravitating around the 
Prussian philosophy faculties, initially the scene of Wolff’s personal academic 
success and later anti-Wolffian strongholds until his return, Descartes’ name 
was customarily used as a polemical weapon, especially by the pietists, con-
cerned to explain the atheism imputed to Wolff with Cartesian impiety and 
its Spinozan and Leibnizian degenerations, and in perennial conflict with the 
Wolffian faction. Though the immediate target for pietist criticism is Wolff’s phi-
losophy, Descartes is often called into play in the dispute as one of the pre-
cursors of his determinism. Wolff’s opponents habitually fail to name their ad-
versary directly, preferring to shoot their polemical darts against Descartes, 
Spinoza and Leibniz46. Among the many examples we could mention Joachim 
Lange, a front-line figure in the initial stages of the anti-Wolffian campaign. In 
his Modesta disquisitio novi philosophiae systematis de Deo, mundo et homi-
ne, et praesertim de harmonia commercii inter animam et corpus praestabilita 
(1723), all the criticisms are levelled at Leibniz and Wolff, obviously the main 
polemical target of the pietist, is never named. Where mention is made of an 
anonymous metaphysics, this is none other than Wolff’s Deusche Metaphysik47. 
45) On these texts cf. SUITNER, Riccarda, Der Krieg der Biographen. zu den ersten literarischen 
Darstellungen der Leben von Christian Thomasius und August Hermann Francke, in Vita als Wis-
senschaftssteuerung, ed. by K. Enenkel and  C. zittel, Berlin-Münster-Wien-zürich-London, LIT, in 
press. The fictional conversations between Thomasius and Francke, between Leibniz and Budde 
and between Descartes and Rüdiger are part of a corpus of dialogues of the dead on philosophi-
cal subjects published anonymously between the late 1720s and the early 1730s. These texts 
have never been the subject of specific research, nor have they ever been seen as belonging to a 
unitary group; their authors and places of composition have often been erroneously identified. An 
exhaustive presentation of all the Totengespräche will be provided by the monograph which I am 
currently preparing. 
46) SPARN, Walter, Einleitung to BUDDE, Johann F., Elementa philosophiae instrumentalis, seu 
institutionum philosophiae eclecticae, vol. I, Halle, Typis et impensis orphanotrophii, 1723, reprint 
ed. by W. Sparn, Hildesheim-zürich-New York, Olms-Weidmann, 2006, p. XLV.
47) LANGE, Joachim, Modesta disquisitio, novi philosophiae systematis de Deo, mundo et homine, 
et praesertim de harmonia commercii inter animam et corpus praestabilita […], Halle, prostat in 
officina orphanotrophei, 1723, reprint ed. by J. École, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, Olms, 1986. 
Cf. WUNDT, Max, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im zeitalter der Aufklärung, Tübingen, Mohr (Sie-
beck), 1945, p. 236.
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The perspective adopted by the author of the dialogues between Leibniz 
and Budde and between Descartes and Rüdiger thus follows in the footsteps of 
a widespread dissimulatory practice which finds its extreme radicalization and 
dramatization in the encounter with the literary genre of the Totengespräch: 
in the two texts Budde and Rüdiger, Wolff’s adversaries, level their attacks di-
rectly against the fictitious figures of Descartes and Leibniz, who become a 
sort of incarnation of the philosophical ideas stigmatized by the anti-Wolffians. 
Perhaps the most important feature of the dialogue between Rüdiger and 
Descartes is precisely this: the creation of two levels which tend to become 
confused, a refined exchange of roles between Wolff and Descartes, forced 
to champion Wolff’s controversial and scandalous philosophy. This conside-
ration can obviously also be extended to the dialogue between Leibniz and 
Johann Franz Budde. The entanglement in the two dialogues of the dead bet-
ween Rüdiger and Budde’s professed anti-Wolffism and their fictitious argu-
ment with Descartes and Leibniz is particularly successful because it is graf-
ted onto a double polemic in which the two philosophers had engaged during 
their lifetimes: the main targets of Rüdiger’s works were Wolff and Descartes, 
whilst some of Budde’s writings had attacked “Leibnizian-Wolffian” philosophy. 
Through fictional arguments between thinkers, the two dialogues compared 
here thus help to paint a picture of a clash involving students and professors, 
theologians, doctors and philosophers: a great cultural battle which was to de-
termine the fate of the Aufklärung and of which Leibniz, Budde, Descartes and 
Rüdiger were the direct or indirect protagonists.
(Translation from German by Erika Milburn)
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